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GOETHE'S SOUL CONCEPTION.
BY THE EDITOR.

THE
"What

number of The Open Court
God?" by Orlando J. Smith, and I

present

to

is

contains an article
heartily

recommend

our readers a careful consideration of the ideas there presented.

do not hesitate to say that Mr. Smith's God-conception is the same
my own. In fact he uses quite similar arguments, in one case
I refer
the very same in almost the same language as I do myself
to the one based upon the eternality of such truth as is represented
I

as

;

by the multiplication

Our

—

table.

differences begin

when he

To him

discusses the nature and im-

is a monad, a unit, a certain
something which migrates from one personality to another and is
This view is untenable from my
reincarnated again and again.

mortality of the soul.

the soul

conception of things spiritual, because spiritual things are not entities.

They

are not substantial, and they can never assume the forms

of monads.
if it is

If the soul

is

not a substantial entity that originates

form and not matter or energy,

its

continuance can not depend

upon the identity of a substance of any kind
vation of form.

This

in fact is

bvit

must be a preser-

the real state of things, for a pres-

ervation of form actually takes place in our bodily constitution.

There

is

a preservation of our bodily appearance under constant slow

modifications
cially of

;

we

retain the structure of our sense organs,

our memory.

The

continuity of our

life is

and espe-

simply due to the

preservation of form in the constant flux of the vital functions which

The changes, growth, and all the various fluctuabody account most easily for those of our consciousness.
The fundamental problem of psychology has found its classical
formulation in the contrast that obtains between Brahmanism and
Buddhism, the former set forth in the philosophy of both the
Vedanta and the Upanishads, and the latter in the Questions of King
Milinda and other Buddhist books. Brahmanism asserts. Buddhism
constitute

life.

tions of our
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denies the separate existence of a soul entity, called atman,

— an

i.

e..

immutable eternal self. And if the Vedanta view itaken seriously, there is no middle g^round.
Either the soul is or
"self,"

is

not a concrete substantial

Tcrtiion

thin.c:.

but the one alternative of yea or nay. and

horn of the dilemma.

would be by

takins^^

The

way

only

There

dotitr.

iioii

we must

is

accept either

to reconcile the

two views

the \'e(lanta view as a poetical allej^^orv invented

for the purpose of drivin.q-

home

to

the

])eople

the truth of the

and importance of the soul.'
The assumption of a soul-entity not only conflicts with facts
that are well established by science but also leads into innumerable
complications.
For these reasons we reject the Vedanta view of
an atman, and side with the Buddhist doctrine of the anatman, the
actuality

non-existence of a special

Nevertheless the soul remains as

self.

and the rules of morality g-ain rather than lose in significance for we must insist that the actions of man are even more
important if they mould the soul, than if we assume it to be an immutable entity.
real as ever,
;

Having repeatedly discussed the problem of the soul, both in
and books, (for instance The Soul of Man and Whence and
Whither), we will not enter here into the subject again, but we w^ill

articles

say that Mr. Orlando

J. Smith's view of the soul is of great interest
on account of the similarity which it bears to Goethe's view.
Goethe had a dislike for abstract considerations. He was too
much of a poet and liked to think even spiritual truths in such a way
as to let them assume a definite and concrete shape.
He was too

to us,

human
to the

and so
in

not to prefer the scnse-j^erceptible image which

formula which
if

is

certain views

general and devoid of

became too abstract

for

all

is

palpable,

tangible elements,

him he clothed them

poetical allegories.

As to his view of the nature of the soul Goethe was careful not
commit himself definitely in his writings, but in conversation he
now and then uttered ideas which indicate that his views of reincarnation resembled strongly the Vedanta view and also the theory
here presented by Mr. Orlando Smith.
The main tenets of immortality, and even of reincarnation, are
to

repeatedly expressed in Goethe's

We have collected
'The

own

writings and in his letters.

the pertinent evidences in an article on the subject

subject has been treated

in

an article "Brahmanisni and Buddhism,

or the Religion of Postulates and the Religion of Facts" in
Vol. X, p. 4851 ff.

The Open Court,
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which has appeared
the

"Goethe's

title

in
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The Open Court (Vol. XX,

\''iew of

p.

367

ff.)

under

Immortality."

In his writings Goethe abstained from committing himself to
the belief in a soul-entity,

and

his views are stated in such general

terms that they might suit either the Buddhists or the Vedantists,
but in

his

Brahman

conversations

view, and

we

he went

further,

taking

decidedly

the

will here present those additional expressions

Eckermann and Falk.
Goethe said to Eckermann on September i, 1829:
"I do not doubt our continuance, for nature can not do without
continuity but we are not all immortal in the same way, and in
order to manifest himself as a great entelechy, a man must first be
of his thought which he mentions privately to

;

one."

Here Goethe
denotes that

falls

back upon a technical term of Aristotle which

something which makes things actual.

The word

"entelechy" means the cjuality of having become complete, of being
perfected, or having attained
to "dynamis,"^
its

e.,

i.

that principle or factor

The

purpose.- and

potential existence,

mere

possibility, its

its

potentiality.

which

is

is

used

in contrast

the idea of a thing,

Accordingly, entelechy denotes

which renders things

actual.

idea of an entelechy as a separate being

is

decidedly meta-

There is
There is not
motion, and an agent of motion, a being that makes motion move.
There is not actuality and a thing that makes actuality act. The
physical and,

if

taken seriously, would lead to dualism.

not reality and a principle that makes reality

real.

and also of living beings is their existence itself
and living beings (i. e., organisms) originate in a slow process of
evolution by a combination of their parts, or as we had better call
it by organization.
We may regard them as actualizations of eternal
actuality of things

types, but in that case

which

is

we can

only

mean

their potential existence,

the possibility of their special combinations, in the same

sense as mathematical truths are eternal and exist even before any

mathematician has discovered and actualized them.

Goethe apparently takes the word in the sense of an entity. On
March 2, 1830, we find the term "entelechy" mentioned again in
another slightly different connection. There he is reported as having said:
'''

irrc/.txiia is

jective iiTt/w
/-tir,

the

from which

same
^

derived from

means
it is

tm'/j'/c.

"perfect", and tjfn', " to have".

The

ad-

commanding"; and the verb trrfAcommand". The root of the latter

also "powerful, mighty,

derived, "to enjoin, to

as that of the

noun

iK'vauic. potentiality.

ri'/.oc.

"end", "purpose".

-

:
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"The
what

persistence of the individual and the fact that

does not agree with him, are proofs to

man

rejects

that such a thing as an

Leibnitz cherished similar ideas concerning such

entelechy exists.

independent

me

entities,

we

only that what

call

'entelechy' he called

"

'monads.'

Almost seventeen years prior to these conversations with Eckermann Goethe used the term "monad" in a talk with Falk who accompanied him on his return from the funeral of Wieland. With reference to the impossibility that Wieland's soul could have been an-

Goethe said
"There can be no thought of an annihilation in nature of such
high psychic powers, nor under any conditions, for she is not wasteWieland's soul is by nature a treasure, a real
ful of her capital.
gem. Moreover, during the whole of his long life he did not use
up these spiritual and beautiful talents, but increased them
"A personal continuance of our soul after death by no means
nihilated,

have made for many years
beings and all those in
seems to be an outcome of them and

conflicts with the observations

which

concerning the constitution of our
nature.

On

finds in

them new confirmation.

the contrary,

"How much
served,

or

how

it

little

I

own

of a personality deserves to be pre-

another question, and an affair which

is

we must

leave to

God. At present I will only say this: I assume different classes
and degrees of ultimate aboriginal elements of all beings which are,
I might
as it were, the initial points of all phenomena in nature.

them souls because from them the animation of the whole proPerhaps I had better call them monads. Let me retain this
ceeds.

call

term of Leibnitz, because it expresses the simplicity of these simplest
beings and there might be no better name. Some of these monads
or initial points, experience teaches, are so small and so insignificant
that they are fit only for a subordinate service and existence. Others

however are quite strong and powerful
"All

monads are by nature

so indestructible that they can not

moment of dissolution, but must
very same moment. Thus they only part from
In this
in order to enter at once into new ones.

stop or lose their activity at the

continue

it

in the

their old relations

change

all

depends on the power of intention which resides

in this

or that monad.

"Each monad proceeds

to

whithersoever

it

belongs, into the

.water, into the air, into the earth, into the fire, into the stars, yea

the secret tendency which conducts

it

thither, contains at the

same

;

GOETHE
time the secret of
is

its

S
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Any thought

of annihilation

quite exchided

"Should we venture on suppositions, I really do not understand
what could prevent the monad to which we owe the appearance of
Wieland on our planet to enter in its new state of existence into the
highest combination of this universe.
genius, through which

many

historical states,

By

its

diligence,

has incorporated into

it
it

its

entitled to anything.

is

own
I

its zeal,

its

existence so

should not be

meet Wieland again
Then I should see him and bear
as a star of the first magnitude.
witness how he with his dear light would gladden and quicken
everything that would come near him.
"To bring light and clearness into the nebular existence of some
comet should be deemed a joyous task for a monad such as the one
Considering the eternity of this universe of ours,
of our Wieland
no other duty, generally speaking, can be assumed for monads than
that they in their turn should partake of the joys of the gods as
blessed creative powers.
They are conversant with the becoming

astonished at

should

all

I,

after millenniums,

!

Whether

come by themselves
from the mountains, from the oceans,
stars.
Who can prevent them?
'T am sure that I, such as you see me here, have lived a thousand times, and hope to come again another thousand times."
There is a great lack of lucidity in these sentences. On the
one hand the monads are the simplest realities, a kind of atoms,
which belong to fire, water, earth, and other elementary existences
on the other hand, they are psychic agencies, and are introduced to
personify the law that sways the formation of a nebula into a
planetary system and again they are assumed to be psychic entities.
Perhaps some monads are thought to be chemical atoms and others
psychic powers and the latter, after the fashion of the Greek deities,
are expected to do the work of the natural laws.
Such thoughts
are poetry, not science fiction, not psychological facts mythology,

of creation.

from all
from the

on

sides,

all

called or uncalled, they

paths,

;

;

;

;

not philosophy.
If

we knew Goethe from

he was a mystic.

We

this

passage alone

we would

say that

grant that he had a mystic vein whenever

he happened to speak or refer to the soul, but even here he disliked
the excrescences of mysticism.

He

avoided having anything to do

with clairvoyance and other pathological or semi-pathological phe-

nomena.

He

not only disliked to delve into inquisitions of mysterious

events, but also to analyze psychological problems in abstract speculations.

Thus

his views

remained hazy and

indistinct.

He

accepted

—

:
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imniortality as a fact, not because

thoug^bt

it

could not be proved.

could be

it

— but

])rovC(l.

—

iti

fact

be

because be could not dispense

witb an infinite outlook into tbc past as well as tbc future.
(

iotbe's conversation

witb Falk

is

perba])s tbe most important

passage to be quoted on tbc mooted topic, and

may

it

be well to

tences,

mind tbat it was I'alk and not Goetbe wbo wrote tbese senand tbat tbey tberefore must be used witb discretion. Never-

theless

we can

bear

in

be believed
I)ression

was so dear
of

clusion

not doubt tbat Cioetbc held similar views, an<l tbat

in the existence of

to

him

monads or

tbat in his

Yea

entelecbies.

first

tbe ex-

conception of tbe con-

Faust he used the word entelechy when sayin<j that

Faust's soul

was

carried uj) to heaven by an^^els.

In tbe printed

by the term "Faust's Immortal."
Eckermann has recorded several of Goethe's remarks which
corroborate, at least in c^eneral, that he held these notions. For ineditions he replaced

stance under

March

it

ii,

we

1828.

comment

the following^

find

of

Goethe's

"Each entelechy

a piece of eternity, and those

few years
body do not make it old."
In a conversation witb his friends. Chancellor von Mueller
and Herrn von Riemer, October 19. 1823. Goethe declared that it
would be quite impossible for a thinking being to entertain the idea
of its own non-existence or tbc discontinuance of its thought and
during which

it

is

is

joined to

its

terrestrial

Accordingly every one carried a proof of his

life.

own

immortality

commit himself to objective statements, as soon as he would venture to come out
with it, as soon as be wanted to prove dogmatically or comprehend a
personal continuance, as soon as he would bolster up this inner observation in a commonplace way, he woidd lose himself in contra-

quite immediately in himself, but as soon as he tried to

dictions."

In his "Prose Sayings" Goethe says:

"The highest we have
viz.,

no

received from

tbe rotating motion of tbe

rest

nor ceasing.

monad

The tendency

God and Nature

arouild

itself,

to preserve

naturally and indelibly inborn in every one, but

and cherish
its

is

life,

which knows
life

is

nature remains

The second favor which comes
from the Supreme Being is what we call experience in life, our becoming aware of things, and the influences which the living and
moving monad exerts upon the surroundings of tbe outer world.
Thereby the monad feels itself as infinite within and limited with-

a mystery to us as well as to others.

out."

Spri'iche in Prosa,

1028- 1029.

:
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In a conversation with Chancellor von Miiller. February, 25,
1824, Goethe expressed his dislike to investig-ate the question of

life

after death.

"To be engrossed with
leisure classes,

An

able

and

man who

the ideas of immortalit}-

women who

especially for

is

only for the

have nothing to do.

needs to make himself useful here, and

who

ac-

cordingly has to exert himself daily, to struggle and to work, leaves
the future world alone

Considering

all

and

is

active

and useful

these quotations

it

is

in this one."

certain that Goethe as-

sumed

the existence of a soul-entity, an entelechy or

in his

opinion was necessary for comprehending the nature of the

and

soul
tian,

of

its

immortality, and the latter

but an Oriental belief,

some kind.

He

i.

traditional Chris-

a reincarnation or metempsychosis

e.,

speaks repeatedly of his former existences

poem addressed

for instance in a

was not the

monad, which

to

Frau von

;

so

Stein, he declares

sympathy which binds their souls, he feels that in "bygone ages she must have been either his sister or his wife."'*
When he traveled in Italy Goethe declared that he must have
lived there, and he went so far as to state that it must have been in the
days of the Emperor Hadrian. Pie wrote on October 12, 1786 from
that in the

\"enice

"Indeed
the

first

I feel

even

time, but as

With

all

if I

now

as if I were not seeing things here
saw them again."

due respect for

his greatness,

we

for

believe that Goethe

has not elaborated his views of the soul nor matured them into clear

and scientifically tenable propositions.
and too little of a philosopher, in

—

labors.

He

He was
spite

too

much

of a poet

of his several scientific

actually disliked explanations in abstract terms.

however, interesting to find that
ception of immortality
*

is

]\Ir.

Orlando

J.

Smith

in his

It is.

con-

backed by such a great man as Goethe.

"Ach, du warst

in

abgelebten Zeiten

Meine Schwester oder meine Frau."

